Enchantment and Morality

Atheism advocates a disenchanted world, but morality itself is a kind of enchantment. For instance, atheistic materialism disenchants humanity itself, saying that humas are just matter, like rocks or bacteria—there is no spirit, God, or divinity setting us apart from anything else (living or non-living) in the universe. But does the atheist say that rocks or bacteria should “work together for the good of all other rocks or bacteria” as a matter of morality? If not, then why should humans, whom the atheist insists, are mere matter themselves, do so? If the atheist says that humans are different than rocks or bacteria because they have free will, then he’s just re-enchanted the world and violated his own materialism, since free will is decidedly non-material (and not detectable scientifically). They dismiss spirit, God, miracles, and other products of religion as “superstition” and claim to be hard-nosed realists willing to confront the harsh reality of a disenchanted world, until the moment they realize that this would lead them straight where Nietzsche went—to a transvaluation of all values—at which point they pull back and re-enchant the world with talk of “moral duties” “human rights” and “the golden rule,” all of which goes against their entire materialist/disenchantment project. This, as I see it, is the ultimate problem of trying to ground morality in atheism.